The actuality of Trump’s inaction was highlighted in Brooks’ conversation with the committee staffer: “And according to your knowledge, did that occur on January 6th?” the staff member continued.
“No,” replied Brooks.
Dean asserts that had Trump initiated a phone conversation with Pentagon commanders at 2:00 p.m., which coincided with the initial entry of the Capitol, and instructed them to “go,” the guard would have arrived at the Capitol earlier on that particular day.
Dean stated to congressional investigators on March 26th, “I believe we would have gone and arrived at our destination much more quickly if the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of Defense, or the president had authorized it with a simple majority vote.”
Four witnesses, including Brooks and Dean, are scheduled to appear before a House subcommittee on Wednesday to provide testimony regarding security deficiencies that worsened the Capitol breach.
On January 6, all four were senior advisors to William Walker, the commander of the Washington, D.C. guard. Additional witnesses consist of Timothy Nick, who served as Walker’s aide-de-camp, and Earl Matthews, a prominent National Guard attorney during that period. The transcripts of closed-door interviews that all four individuals participated in for the Administration Committee over the previous five weeks were reviewed by POLITICO.
The primary focus of their testimony centered on the profound divergence of opinion between the Pentagon and the D.C. guard leadership regarding the timing and existence of a directive to be deployed to the Capitol. According to the testimony provided to the Administration Committee by the witnesses, military commanders appeared hesitant to dispatch guard soldiers to the Capitol until hours after the outbreak of violence.
Moreover, they recounted receiving contradictory information during phone conversations with the Pentagon, which resulted in a state of uncertainty regarding their authorization to proceed with the deployment. In addition, all four individuals stated they had provided testimony to the committee on January 6 in a “informal” capacity, denoting the absence of transcripts for their interviews.
Furthermore, they reported having almost no communication from the then-Army secretary, Ryan McCarthy, despite the fact that he was a crucial character who maintained regular communication with the D.C. guard prior to January 6.
McCarthy declined the request for comment in his response. He informed the committee on January 6 that a phone call from Trump would not have accelerated the National Guard’s response because he was already proceeding at top speed.
The testimony further complicates an already convoluted account of the military’s reaction to the violence that erupted for hours on January 6 before the Capitol Police were assisted in containing it that evening by the D.C. police and National Guard.
The riot select committee determined that during the fury of violence, Trump did not contact senior leaders of the Justice Department, Pentagon, or Department of Homeland Security, nor did he communicate with his vice president, Mike Pence, who was seeking refuge in the Capitol.
Conversely, Trump observed the unfolding violence via television while calling legislators in an attempt to elicit their support in his effort to obstruct the victory of President Joe Biden.
The men, whom the panel referred to as “whistleblowers,” vehemently contest assertions made by former Pentagon leaders, including former Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, McCarthy, and then-Acting Defense Secretary Chris Miller, that the National Guard was expeditiously deployed to the Capitol on January 6.
They assert that they did not receive any correspondence from McCarthy or Miller until much later that day, and they vehemently refute assertions that McCarthy gave the go-ahead for the guard’s deployment to the Capitol at 3:04 p.m. on January 6.
Given the apparent deterioration of conditions at the Capitol, Brooks and Dean hypothesized that a phone call from Trump might have been able to cut through the din and expedite the deployment.
Regarding whether Trump’s participation could have been decisive, Matthews was in opposition to Brooks and Dean. Matthews tells the Administration Committee that Trump had little to do because he had already delegated authority to Miller and McCarthy. It is unclear whether McCarthy would have heeded his call, Matthews adds.
“The president has confidence in the chain of command and therefore did not intend to contact us,” Matthews explained to the Administration panel. He noted that certain military leaders’ concerns were highlighted in testimony to the committee on January 6 regarding the possibility that Trump could attempt to use a troop presence at the Capitol for nefarious purposes.
McCarthy denied in his January 6 testimony before the committee any apprehensions that Trump might improperly utilize the National Guard.
McCarthy stated, “I did not observe anything leading up to it that would have suggested he was going to order us to send troops to the Capitol in support of something nefarious.”
Matthews explicated his conviction in a statement he released prior to his public testimony.
“The committee was cognizant of the fact that President Trump’s personal summons to the Army Secretary, who possessed operational authority over the D.C. National Guard, in order to instruct the Guard’s immediate maneuver would have been ineffectual.”
